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Criticism as a Creative Act
Dean Wilcox1
Reading texts is a matter of reading them in the light of 
other texts, people, obsessions, bits of information, 
or what have you, and then seeing what happens.
—Richard Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress” in 
Interpretation and Overinterpretation
In his essay “The Interpreter: A Self-Analysis” literary critic Geoffrey Hartman 
writes: “I have a superiority complex vis-à-vis other critics, and an inferiority 
complex vis-à-vis art.”2 While I would not go so far as to assert his first statement, 
I often wonder if the second observation applies to my work in theatre criticism. 
It is an odd position, that of the critic, to reflect upon and write about the practical 
endeavors of others. The act of interpreting and analyzing that which was created 
without one’s help is a tenuous action at best. And yet, writing critically about one’s 
own work seems somewhat redundant. While I am reluctant to analyze my own 
theatre work, I revel in tearing apart and reassembling the work of others. Perhaps 
it is because in creating a piece of theatre critical energies are tied up in production, 
whereas with criticism practical energies are tied up in observation. I wonder if 
this point is the root of the superiority vs. inferiority that Hartman mentions or the 
origin of the tension between the practice of theatre and the criticism of theatre.  
After spending long hours in a darkened space working to create something 
unique, something new, something practical, it is easy to dismiss the work of 
someone that merely writes about this action. It is easy to privilege the “doing” 
over the “talking about” since theory and criticism can be described as abstract 
or divorced from the “reality” of practical work. As opposed to an artistic activity 
that attempts to imbue something with meaning, criticism can be seen as an 
interpretation, an examination, or worse, the long-since debunked decoding of 
hidden meaning. Samuel Beckett’s statements about James Joyce’s writing clearly 
articulates this position: Beckett wrote that in Joyce’s writing “form is content, 
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content is form” and that the work “is not about something; it is that something 
itself.”3 What, then, is the point of criticism if the meaning, form, and structure of a 
work are contained within the work itself? Why bother to employ complex and often 
convoluted theoretical ideas such as semiotics, deconstruction, or phenomenology 
to discuss a performance if the performance is already something itself?  
This rift between the “doing” and the “talking about” often manifests an 
animosity that many practitioners have toward theory. As Gerald Rabkin articulates 
in “The Play of Misreading: Text/Theatre/Deconstruction,” “most pragmatic 
American and British theatre people . . . would second Laurence Olivier’s remark 
that ‘Personally, I loathe all abstract discussions of the theatre.’” But, as Rabkin 
continues, the terms “theatre” and “theory” “have the same root—theasthai: to 
look on, view, contemplate—and consciously or unconsciously, all theatre has its 
theoretical base.”4 It is this understanding that is echoed by Herbert Blau when he 
states, “[T]heatre is theory, or a shadow of it” for in the very act of seeing theatre 
“there is already theory.”5 Even a choice as elementary as a color palette has 
semiotic and theoretical implications since it affects how an entire production is 
viewed. Despite the fact that practice is clearly animated theory, I find that, when 
dealing with young actors, designers, and directors, I must continually reiterate that 
any method or practice demonstrates theoretical ideas whether articulated or not. 
Regardless of this arbitrary division, theory and practice tend to collapse into 
the general idea of theatre. Even if one element seems to exist without the other, 
time proves the conjunction of the two. Take someone like Antonin Artaud, for 
example, who did have a background in the “professional” theatre, but is far better 
remembered for his theoretical ideas. By producing theory that he was unable, 
according to his contemporaries, to successfully convert into practice, he inspired 
generations of practitioners. The opposite is true of artists like Erwin Piscator and 
Vsevolod Meyerhold, who were primarily content to focus on practice with the 
hope of addressing theory later, which generally never came to fruition. It was left 
to succeeding generations to theorize their practice. 
Theatre history seems to hold a special place for those like Konstantin 
Stanislavski, Bertolt Brecht, and Richard Wagner who were able to merge theory 
and practice in their work. From our historical vantage point their productions may 
be abandoned to time, outlined by descriptive or photographic residue, but their 
theories, which boost our knowledge of their practical ideas, remain undiminished 
for future generations. It is the combination of these elements that has made their 
work appealing to both critics and practitioners. 
 As someone who moves between the worlds of theory and practice, I am a firm 
believer that any act of criticism is a creative act. While this is not a new argument, 
I propose to explore a fundamental similarity between these two activities. The 
same interpretive problems arise in transferring a text from the page to the stage 
that arise in transferring a performance from the stage to the page. As critics we 
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make choices, focus attention, employ metaphors, and conduct the viewpoint of 
our readers in the same spirit as actors, designers, and directors. In writing about 
performance, we employ similar strategies of focus, rhythm, pace, juxtaposition, 
and iteration that dominate the historical and contemporary stage. We use theory in 
a practical sense to create a form of theatre as we reflect upon the work of others. 
It is this notion of creative criticism that I see contained in the Richard Rorty 
quotation above. Here, he raises two specific issues on the process of “reading texts” 
that I will extend to “reading” performances. The first is the use of “light” as a way 
of exploring texts via other texts, people, and obsessions. This is, quite obviously, 
a well-worn philosophical metaphor that carries with it connotations of eradicating 
darkness through analytical illumination. Oedipus’ blindness and insight, Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, idea-generated light bulbs precariously dangled overhead are 
all useful images of enlightened consciousness, which tend to include the notion 
of truth, reality, and/or inspiration. The second point, which may take some time 
to address, has to do with the pragmatic notion of “seeing what happens.”
I have an interest in light not merely as a symbolic tool but also as an artistic 
medium. I come to the world of theatre criticism from the world of lighting design. 
I say this not to brag or apologize, but to situate my critical aesthetics within the 
currency of usability that comes with practical theatre training. I was reared in an 
environment where one makes of things what one can, given the perpetual looming 
deadline of opening night. What initially attracted me to the field of lighting design 
was not that it can be used symbolically, but that it offered to someone like me, who 
was interested in design but had limited drawing skills, an intangible medium—one 
in which the designs are informed by thought, concept, language, and description. 
In this sense, lighting design is as dependent upon theoretical ideas as it is upon 
aesthetics. 
Light is essentially energy, invisible and immaterial until it is animated by the 
material world. Objects within a field of vision both absorb and reflect light, and it 
is this symbiotic relationship that allows objects to become visible, light to become 
“material.” Unlike light, which has the quality of dissemination, objects are finite; 
they have contours, limits, boundaries, and are used to define spatial relationships. 
Objects present specific information, like color, which is revealed, by light reflecting 
off a surface, thus creating the highlight and shadow that enable us to apprehend 
the visual world. While Parker and Smith argue in the classic Scene Design and 
Stage Lighting that “light reveals form,”6 it can also be said that form reveals light. 
This process is compounded by the fact that surrounding objects also absorb 
and reflect light that, in turn, falls upon other objects. This nearly invisible process 
of reflection upon reflection upon reflection animates the entire visual field. Shadow, 
which can best be defined as “an outgrowth of the object that cast it,”7 helps situate 
the object in space and in relation to other objects, including the viewer. Objects, 
then, are never seen in isolation, but always in contrast with the position of the 
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viewer, other objects, their shadows, and their reflected light. 
Training as a lighting designer, I quickly discovered that the process of 
manipulating the illumination within a performance is not as simple as turning on 
a light. Rather, it is a complex process of interaction between objects and energy 
grounded in the overall flow of a performance, which is often derived from an 
interpretation of an original text. Within the theatre we approach what Roland 
Barthes might call “multi-dimensional space” in which a variety of elements—a 
seemingly inexhaustible list of signifying elements including text, body, gesture, 
setting, properties, costume, lighting, and make-up, among others—“blend and 
clash” to create the performance.8 I was fascinated as a young designer by the fact 
that while light could not substantially alter objects on stage, it could, through the 
manipulation of color, angle, intensity, contrast, and movement, alter the appearance 
of objects on stage.9 
I am not arguing that lighting design should be given a prominent position in 
the hierarchy of production elements; rather, my argument is a more theoretical 
one, namely that an immaterial element like light greatly affects how we perceive 
the objects and, thereby, texts placed in front of us. In dealing with the material 
world, one must keep in mind Rorty’s first point that the act of reading—of a text, 
performance, object, gesture, or any other semiotic process—involves a triadic 
negotiation between “text,” reader, and “light,” or a particular analytical frame of 
mind. These are not separate pieces but, like light, objects, and viewer, cohere as 
a dynamic interaction of elements. Since objects, texts, and gestures are always 
viewed in contrast to other objects, texts, and gestures, the overall context, loosely 
defined as the immediate visual field or analytical approach, will always bear upon 
the act of interpretation and understanding. While Joyce’s work, then, may be 
“that something itself,” it is not so in isolation from other works, theories, ideas, 
or practices. 
Joyce, like any artist, is a product of his time and any attempt to isolate his 
work from its context, or, say, a signifying element from the ebb and flow of a 
performance, is doomed to become Olivier’s loathed abstraction. By way of pushing 
the light metaphor a bit further, I want to consider two very different ideas behind 
color theory as a way of structuring this discussion and underscoring the difference 
between theory as an abstraction and criticism as an act of creativity. Anyone 
who has ever seen a textbook image of the color spectrum is aware of Newton’s 
color theory. Using a prism Newton “abstracted” white light into its constituent 
parts:  red, orange, yellow, green, blue and violet. What Newton uncovered were 
the different frequencies of light perceptible to the human eye. The prism allowed 
him, as it were, to see the components that make up white light split apart. While 
it is hard to deny the importance of Newton’s discovery, it is rare to find light in 
the “natural” world divided into such pure elements since any beam of light will 
inevitably interact with objects, shadows, and reflections. This is how theory and 
Fall 2010                                                                                                            45
criticism can be viewed: as abstractions, separate from the flow of performance, a 
clinical examination divorced from practice. 
Now, far be it from me to refute the work of Sir Isaac Newton. My point 
here is that his exploration of light, while valid, removed that light from any kind 
of practical or “natural” situation. There are, however, other models to explore. 
Working one hundred years after Newton, Goethe developed a completely different 
theory of color in light. Rather than isolate light in a laboratory, Goethe took his 
prisms outside and looked at clouds, trees, and reflective surfaces. What Goethe 
developed was a theory based on the interaction of light and objects in which the 
viewer was integral to the image. As James Gleick points out in his exploration 
of Chaos Theory,
Goethe refused to view color as a static quantity, to be measured 
in a spectrometer and pinned down like a butterfly to cardboard. 
He argued that color is a matter of perception. “With light poise 
and counterpoise, Nature oscillates within her prescribed limits,” 
he wrote, “yet thus arise all the varieties and conditions of the 
phenomena which are presented to us in space and time.”10
Newton was a scientist (for some, the scientist), whereas Goethe was a Romantic 
poet and philosopher. Newton interrupted a beam of light with a prism and 
observed what happened on the laboratory wall. Goethe looked through prisms, 
studied shadows, and examined the different qualities of light that existed in the 
world around him. Newton’s scientific approach, in short, revealed a clinical 
understanding of color and light, whereas Goethe’s rested on a philosophical or 
pragmatic understanding. 
It is this notion of light described by Goethe as a dynamic interaction between 
elements that I see in relation to Rorty’s shining of people, obsessions, and texts upon 
other texts. The light of these texts is not intended to be more truthful, especially for 
a pragmatist like Rorty, but merely to provide an illuminating energy for the current 
reading. It is here where interaction, contextualization, illumination, tension, and 
contradictions between elements are all possible outcomes. Like my understanding 
of light as a young designer, Rorty’s light does not alter the substance of the text 
but can alter its appearance. 
It was with a background in lighting design and a mindset focused on 
convergences, then, that I initially encountered the theoretical perspectives offered 
by semiotics, feminism, Marxism, deconstruction, and phenomenology. As my 
training began to focus less on practical matters and more on theoretical positions, 
I wondered how far this idea of convergences could be taken. I pondered where 
the limits of this interaction were when it came to literature, theory, history, and 
performance analysis. I became fascinated with the ideas and techniques developed 
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by studying lighting design in a theoretical, as opposed to a practical, sense. 
Despite Blau’s argument that the shadow of theory exists in any act of theatre, 
my practical experience suggested that in most, but not all, situations theories were 
often best left outside the doors of the theatre. I recall once as a design student I 
was told, “[C]ritics write about what we do.” Although I saw the gesture as one 
of commonality as well as separation, it underscored the rift between theory and 
practice that dominated the field of theatre studies at that time. Aside from evoking a 
kind of phenomenological chasm between thinking and doing, this statement seemed 
to suggest that somehow criticism, theory, or analysis were like light—intangible 
and immaterial—until they encountered something solid, like practical action. 
As I began to think about this underlying connection between the two, I 
continued to return to the notion that without light objects remain invisible, and 
that without objects the materiality of light remains at the level of imperceptible 
energy. My hope with the discussion above was to establish a symbiotic relationship 
between light and object in which both are essentially invisible until combined. 
There is no hierarchy intended here; neither is more important than the other. Light 
and object are, in fact, interdependent, and while their relationships with each other 
make both of them visible to us, each relationship is merely a physical process and 
nothing more. Light shines upon objects and they reflect light and can be seen; this 
process, in turn, reveals color, shadow, gaps between objects, spatial context, and 
interactions between elements. 
I have no intention (no matter how tempting) to argue that a performance 
remains “invisible” until the light of analysis shines upon it. I do believe, like 
Beckett, that a work of art is something, and that any discussion of that work is a 
form of translation from one medium to another. But I also subscribe to the idea 
that theory can reveal something about the form or structure of a performance 
that may not initially be apparent. My goal with this essay is to employ this 
distinction between the purely analytical and the pragmatic to discuss the process 
of performance criticism in relation to theory and practice. To be more specific, 
I want to explore my own process as a designer as it relates to the process of 
performance analysis.
Interpreting and analyzing that which was created without one’s input is 
generally acknowledged as a peripheral or supplementary action at best. We are 
almost always outside the text, peering in, entering into this process, at least, once 
removed. Our tools are observation, description, theory, and analysis, none of which 
we can point to in the concrete manner that one can point to work on the stage and 
say, “This is solid, this is performance, this is something that I have done.” 
One of the appealing elements of theoretical positions is that they are 
fundamentally abstract ideas, as intangible as light, in need of a surface to be made 
visible. Theoretical positions, in short, need objects of inquiry, tangible, practical 
examples to animate analytical concerns. Theory, like light, shines upon “texts” 
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to reveal meanings, form, gaps, contexts, and interactions between elements. 
Deconstruction, for example, is essentially a parasitic enterprise in which one needs 
something—a text, a philosophical premise, a work of art—to deconstruct. The 
analysis is not completely external but, like light, reveals what is already there, 
altering, perhaps, the initial appearance. As a theoretical perspective, deconstruction 
brings nothing to the object of analysis that isn’t already contained within the 
target text. It is a form of intellectual jujitsu fully dependent upon its subject since 
the “‘obvious or univocal reading’ always contains the ‘deconstructive reading’ 
as a parasite encrypted within itself as part of itself.”11 This is, like any theoretical 
approach or artistic activity, a process animated by the process itself.
Similar to the light of other texts mentioned by Rorty, Barbara Johnson points 
out that Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive approach is conditioned by that fact that 
his writing “is always explicitly inscribed in the margins of some preexisting text” 
and that he is “first and foremost a reader who constantly reflects on and transforms 
the very nature of the act of reading.”12 If Derrida is first and foremost a reader, 
then he is presumably involved in an active process of interpretation, of struggle, 
of encountering and assaulting problems, of “doing.” This is, I suppose, a comment 
best supported by the fact that many people have written about what he has done. 
Years ago, after first being introduced to Derrida’s work, I endeavored to use 
some of his ideas, as Rorty says, to see what happens. Although Derrida bristled at 
the notion of a singular definition of deconstruction and was even more averse to 
treating it as a methodology that could be applied to various texts and situations, 
I explored it as a particular way of reading. What I discovered was that Derrida’s 
notion of the “hymen,” which can be described as a “fragile membrane that functions 
as a barrier between one area and the next, existing in neither, but allowing both 
to exist concurrently” was extremely useful in discussing the performance style 
of Karen Finley.13 Her early work exemplified the notion of “in-between-ness” 
articulated by Derrida, and, by applying his idea (with all of the sexual innuendo 
in tow) to her work, I was able to see something I felt was fundamental in her 
performance technique. 
This is not to say that swiping an idea from Derrida and applying it to Finley’s 
work fundamentally changed the work, but it gave me a vocabulary and a focus to 
see something I had not initially seen. It revealed, like the interaction of light and 
object, an underlying form. Here, I had three separate pieces: Derrida’s notion of 
the hymen, a recorded segment of Finley’s Constant State of Desire (1986), and my 
own observations. It was the convergence of the three, however, that yielded the 
essay. While this did not fundamentally change Finley’s performance, it did change 
how it appeared to me and, thereby, became a way of analyzing that performance 
and of providing a specific focus to subsequent readers. 
Moving from design to criticism, I was able to see that the two share, not 
the light of truth, but a fundamental basis in asserting a choice of focus. Stage 
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lighting, through the manipulation of the elements mentioned above, helps to 
establish location, time of day, mood, and atmosphere. More importantly, however, 
through highlight and shadow, lighting directs the eye, tells the audience what to 
look at, what elements to pay attention to. This is exactly what I attempted to do 
by utilizing a theoretical idea to explore a “text,” to direct the eye by asking certain 
questions and reading in a specific manner. The argument here is that the arbitrary 
division between analysis and doing is not as solid as it appears. What links these 
two processes, the practical and the analytical, is that method of doing, a procedure 
that operates through such techniques as interaction, contextualization, tension, and 
contradiction to illuminate specific ideas. Or, to be less specific, it is a process of 
putting elements together and seeing what happens. 
One of the things I enjoy about designing for the theatre is the trial-and-error 
process of technical rehearsals. While I was taught to have a fairly good idea of 
what the production should look like prior to entering the performance space, 
imagination can only go so far. The question “What happens if I do this?” presumes 
that hidden messages may be as shallow as a hasty decision made while any number 
of people wait to move on to the next section of the rehearsal. In an ideal situation, 
all facets of a production are thought out, understood, discussed, and executed 
with precision. Working in the theatre, though, has taught me that ideal situations 
are few and far between. It is the practical notion that despite the best efforts and 
intentions a performance always has an opening night and that decisions have to 
be made and executed. 
For a critic who is outside this process to peer in and assume that all elements 
are designed to cohere toward a common purpose or meaning is, at best, a suspension 
of disbelief. The act of creating a performance is a great deal more complex than 
a work by a single author if for no other reason that there may be, despite all the 
lip service paid to collaboration and directorial authority, multiple agendas at 
work within any given moment. While it may be possible to derive a meaning 
from performance, it will always be in contrast to a proliferation of intended and 
unintended meanings. One of my favorite examples of this is Piscator’s use of large 
treadmills to create his production of The Good Soldier Schwejk (1928). Deafening 
in rehearsals, the motors were quieted as much as possible but still remained audible 
and quite humorous in performance. Though not necessarily the initial objective, 
Piscator had “accidentally discovered the potential for subversive humor inherent 
in the modern stage apparatus itself. In one stroke, not only was the arbitrariness 
of spatio-temporal construction made apparent as ideological but the mystical aura 
of the machine also evaporated.”14 
This is not to suggest that all practical choices are arbitrary since, like the 
process of performance analysis itself, they are inevitably judged against the 
production to assess how the choices work within the performative context. But 
anyone that has ever had a “happy accident” in the rehearsal process, where an 
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unintended element is woven into the fabric of the final performance, understands 
that this process can include capricious or partially understood ideas. My favorite 
example of this is Eugenio Barba’s discussion of his 1985 production of The Gospel 
According to Oxyrhincus in which he reexamined Antigone. In his essay “The 
Shadow of Antigone,” Barba discusses the moment when the Grand Inquisitor 
Jehuda approached Antigone shortly after she covered her brother’s severed head 
with her dress. Jehuda did not kill Antigone, but attacked her shadow with a dagger 
by scraping at its edges. He proceeded to “outline the shadow with the dagger and 
at the same time seem[ed] to be trying to efface it.” 15 
As Barba points out, “I worked for a long time to find all the details for this 
scene, without knowing why. I asked myself all the while: why am I working so 
much on this scene, why is this scene so essential for me?”16 It was only later 
when watching a television program about the bombing of Hiroshima that he fully 
understood the impact of this gesture.  The blast from the bomb literally burned 
the image of people into buildings, steps, and sidewalks. Barba now understood 
the scraping of Antigone’s shadow since “it is easy to kill bodies, very easy, but 
some bodies leave shadows, as if their lives were so loaded with energy that they 
remained imprinted on history.”17 Thus, the question “What happens if I do this?” 
is always qualified by the performance as an object that pushes back, provides 
resistance, dictates whether the choice fits within the current context and whether 
it is fully understood or not. 
The same is true for the process of performance analysis. While it’s possible to 
anticipate that performative choices are designed to cohere by serving a common 
goal, a critic that simply lists or narrates these choices offers very little in the way 
of analysis. If there is too clean a fit between theory and practice, the work of the 
critic seems somewhat redundant. In this case, it’s as if the production had already 
done the analytical work, and the job of the critic was to point out the obvious. If 
the purpose of analysis is to illuminate a performance in a specific way, then the 
use of performance material necessitates that examples not only animate but also 
push back on and raise questions about what is essential to a performance. These 
examples, in short, provide resistance to the theory. Like the process of testing 
choices in rehearsal, practical examples challenge the theory to see if it stands up 
to use. Roland Barthes articulates this idea when he likens the process of reading to 
hammering a nail into a piece of wood, which has “a different resistance according 
to the place you attack it.”18 This is as true of every lighting design I have ever 
created as it is of combining Derrida and Finley. Choosing a different color palette 
will create a radically different design as will choosing a different theory to discuss 
a performance. 
This point underscores the fact that if a performance can be constructed in a 
multitude of ways then it can be analyzed in a multitude of ways. One can discuss 
the narrative, the plot structure, the visual structure, the contradictions between 
50                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
signifying systems, the intended or received messages, the performance style, or 
explore a single defining moment. Each of these avenues for analysis may provide 
different areas of resistance that suggest different theoretical approaches. Like 
choosing between a red color filter or a blue one, the choice to use phenomenology, 
deconstruction, feminism, or Aristotlean analysis will alter how the performance 
object is viewed. It is not that theory simply exposes a hidden meaning, but that the 
interaction of the performance object and the method of analysis actually creates 
a meaning. 
The Newtonian approach looks to pin the object down, dissect it, and search 
for a clearer understanding of the whole through its parts; Goethe, on the other 
hand, understood that his own perception conditioned the reception of light and 
shadow in the natural world. While Newton may have uncovered a “truth” about 
the different frequencies of light, he did so by limiting his perception. Articulating 
the rift between the phenomenological and the analytical, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
points out, “We never cease living in the world of perception, but we go beyond it 
in critical thought—almost to the point of forgetting the contribution of perception 
to our idea of truth.”19 The point signaled by this juxtaposition between Newton and 
Goethe’s methods is that a meaning should never be confused with the meaning 
since analysis, like light, cannot change the object but only how it is viewed. 
This statement, finally, brings me to Rorty’s second point in the opening 
quotation: after reading texts in light of other texts, the next step is “seeing what 
happens.” In my own writing process, I understand an essay I’m composing by 
writing it completely, as opposed to merely outlining it or thinking about it. The 
“doing” is central to my construction process. Each revision of an essay refines 
its message as certain elements are developed and others marginalized. This is the 
same trial-and-error process used in theatre practice. In creating a performance 
and constructing an analysis, ideas are tried out, interpretations are challenged, 
and components are rearranged, added, and cut, with the eventual shaping of the 
work into a finished product. 
While I may interpret the role of theatre critic as having a responsibility to the 
work and the reader by providing background or historical material and placing 
the performance into a particular context, I am often more interested in what a 
performance can be used to do. Analysis is not limited to what meaning can be 
drawn from dissecting an object; it is about “seeing what happens,” seeing what 
can be made out of a performance, what resistance it will provide, what questions 
it will raise, and how the process of reading this complex text will affect the act 
of reading itself. This is an action that should not be confused with imposing an 
idea on a production. Theory is a valuable tool that should be used to construct an 
argument, not defend one.
Employing, as I have in the past, a deconstructive strategy to explore the 
work of Karen Finley, Bill Viola, and Robert Wilson was often less about the 
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work and more about the process of exploring the ideas they generated within a 
specific context. As a critic, I did not function as a decoder of the work, isolating 
performance elements as Newton fragmented light into smaller and smaller pieces. I 
approached these “texts” like Goethe by wandering around inside the material to see 
what could be seen and to see what happened when I looked through this particular 
prism or explored this particular theoretical idea. This type of activity is not about 
cracking or revealing a hidden code, or as Rorty cautions, assuming criticism is 
about “discovery rather than creation,”20 but a creative act aligned with Barthes’s 
notion of jouissance, or the pleasure of playing with, in, and through the text. 
Traditionalists, of course, will argue that if a work is created with a specific 
intention then reading it in a different way is a misinterpretation or overinterpretation. 
Eco raises this point in assessing the role of the reader when he stresses the difference 
between interpretation and use. For Eco, “[T]o critically interpret a text means 
to read it in order to discover, along with our reactions to it, something about its 
nature.” To use a text, however, “means to start from it in order to get something 
else, even accepting the risk of misinterpreting it from the semantic point of view.”21 
In this sense, the act of creating a performance by interpreting an originary text 
is no different than creating an analysis by reading a performance. What qualifies 
this process is the pragmatist’s skepticism of ever being able to discover anything 
specific within a text at all, let alone its “nature.” As Rorty explains, 
Having read Eco, or having read Derrida, will often give you 
something interesting to say about a text which you could 
otherwise not have said. But it brings you no closer to what is 
really going on in the text than having read Marx, Freud, Matthew 
Arnold or F.R. Leavis. Each of these supplementary readings 
simply gives you one more context into which you can place 
the text—one more grid you can place on top of it or one more 
paradigm to which to juxtapose it.22
This is not to suggest that performances should be viewed as fodder for what Eco 
calls “interpretive drift,”23 but if a performance is a unified whole built from a 
wide array of parts, and possibly agendas, then the notion of intention may be as 
multifaceted as the text itself.
Recently, I have become fascinated with the subject of postdigital technology 
in the form of hypertext, essentially nonlinear linked text and images. The most 
visible example of what I am referring to is the internet, but, to take advantage 
of the Barthes references above, one might also suggest Barthes’s S/Z, an early 
printed hypertext. This offers a useful metaphor to discuss the creative role of the 
critic. Like performance, it is a fluid medium that is never approached the same 
way twice but constantly built up from a collection of links and reader-oriented 
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choices. The author’s job, then, is to provide the raw material and the fundamental 
organization for the project, while the process of assembling, organizing, and 
“doing” is left up to the reader. 
Since individual readings vary widely according to who is reading and what 
choices they make, the reading process continually feels like a scripting process in 
which one is an active participant. Certainly, most readings, as Johnson indicates 
with her discussion of Derrida, have the potential to be active and critically 
engaged, but this process, via hypertext—a medium that often allows the reader 
to add their own comments, links, and material—is greatly magnified. Absorbing 
the fragmenting strategies of the historical avant-garde, contemporary computer 
technology offers a widely flexible medium in which the boundaries of “object” 
and “light” are often blurred. The internet exists as both a performative and critical 
space in which readers can share their own personal pathway through this type of 
material, bringing in their own ideas, obsessions, and questions to bear upon creative 
work, thereby further blurring the line between theory and practice.
Charles L. Mee, perhaps best described as a postmodern historian/dramatist, 
has created a website that offers exactly this type of activity for his published 
texts. Known as “the (re)making project,” this website offers readers free use of 
Mee’s work as a resource for their own work. Mee, in fact, advocates that readers 
“pillage [his] plays as I have pillaged the structures and contents of the plays of 
Euripides and Brecht and stuff out of Soap Opera Digest and the evening news 
and the internet, and build your own, entirely new piece.”24 This iterative gesture 
illustrates the creative process as one that both interprets and uses texts of all 
kinds to arrive at a final product that is, then, offered up for the same cannibalistic 
process. Mee’s comments about pillaging could serve as sage advice for the process 
of performance analysis in which the critic weaves together multiple sources, 
including an original “text,” the performance, theoretical models, and analytical 
methods filtered through personal observation to build an entirely new work. This 
new work, however, is not closed on meaning but is addressed as part of an ongoing 
process of recontextualization. Or, as Rorty points out, this new work is but one 
more grid one can place on top, which allows others to perpetually reexamine older 
works in a new theoretical light. 
 More recently, the term “postdramatic” has been adopted to define a genre 
that further blurs the notions of text, interpretation, theory, and practice. Writing 
about such artists as Robert Wilson, Heiner Müller, Sarah Kane, and The Wooster 
Group, Hans-Thies Lehmann explains that postdramatic theatre “most definitely 
does not mean a theatre that exists ‘beyond’ drama, without any relation to it. It 
should rather be understood as the unfolding and blossoming of a potential of 
disintegration, dismantling and deconstruction within drama itself.”25 While works 
labeled postdramatic may offer commentary and criticism on specific texts or styles, 
as well as on the performance itself, they are not closed onto a specific meaning 
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but resonate multiple meanings simultaneously. 
One glance at the “script” for Müller’s Explosion of a Memory or Kane’s 4:48 
Psychosis should convince anyone that something has changed since the days 
of traditional dramatic texts. These works exist as blocks of language devoid of 
character, space, description, and often narrative. Nevertheless, they were created 
as dramatic works designed to be interpreted on stage. Like Joyce’s work, these 
pieces are, indeed, not about something but are that something itself; this something, 
however, is widely open to interpretation and augmentation depending upon which 
elements are magnified or added in performance. Working within the history of 
drama and outside the traditional notion of “text,” postdramatic works collapse 
the categories of doer, maker, and spectator creating what Eco might refer to as 
an “open work.”26 
Much has changed since I first encountered the supposed rift between theory 
and practice, and the idea of postdramatic theatre, embryonic at that time, offers 
an alternative to this split. Clearly, if folks like The Wooster Group can offer 
deconstructions of works by Chekhov and Gertrude Stein in which added media, 
gestures, dances, and images augment the initial text, then the only difference 
between theory and practice is the method of delivery. How different is their 
exploration of Stein’s work from Derrida’s of Artaud’s? Do we privilege one as 
“a work of art” because it is presented on stage and the other as “philosophy” or 
“literary criticism” since it is presented in another form? If the artist’s role is to 
use aesthetic properties to make something out of something else, and the critic’s 
role is to use theoretical models to make something out of something else, then the 
dividing line between these activities is as permeable as the one dividing life from 
art. For those unable, or unwilling, to accept the role of explainer or decoder of the 
text, what remains is criticism as a creative act in which elements of performance 
and theory combine to create a new text, which, in turn, contributes to the chain 
of light observed by Rorty. 
This is the space in which analysis takes place: between the performance and 
its interpretation, between the practice and the theory, between the object and the 
light. Each animates the other and, then, is reflected outward to further animate 
other texts. I am a firm believer that any act of criticism is a creative act. From my 
own perspective, my work as a lighting designer follows a very similar pattern 
to my work as a critic. I have found that the same interpretive problems arise in 
transferring a text from the page to the stage that arise in transferring a performance 
from the stage to the page. As a designer, I make choices, focus attention, draw 
on metaphors, and conduct the viewpoint of the audience in the same way that I 
do as a critic. In writing about performance, I employ similar strategies of focus, 
rhythm, pace, and juxtaposition that dominate the historical and contemporary stage. 
As I reflect upon the work of others, I, in a very real sense, create performances, 
objects placed into the world to shine upon and reflect off other objects. My goal 
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in either medium is always to make something out of something else. I say this not 
to defend the actions of those who are thought to “write about what others do,” but 
to underscore the commonality of process between theory and practice, between 
performance and analysis.
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